organizing that and on the other side of the wall people banging four more years so it is a unique time to be any time you are behind the scenes with a president. >> new york times staff photographer douglas mills sunday night at 8:00 on c-span's un day. ..

[applause] >> thank you so much for that, for that kind introduction, and

my thanks to everybody here tonight for coming out in these conditions. if you had not guessed from my accent, i'm from england and headed back there shortly. i think this is preparation after southern california for a british winter. just begin by saying a few words by saying the first time i came to the subject before describing the scenes of the book, now, as you already heard, the -- my previous book was about cia front groups in the early years of the cold war, apparently private, nongovernmental organizations made up of anticommunism citizens engaged in cold war propaganda overseas and emerged the groups were, in fact, secretly funded and managed by the cia. now, one group i didn't really

engage with in the book was the american friends was middle east mainly because its purpose didn't seem to be so much to do with the cold war as was promoting the arab world to an american audience, and, also, it was anti zionist battling the influence of the emerging israel lobby in the 1950s america, and this just seems so sort of odd, and i think expect. i didn't really know what to do with it. i sort of mention it in the mighty will, the book that put the american friends of the middle east to one side, as it were. after the mighty word, i came back to this story and began delving into it further and realized the main office of the main cia officer involved in the creation of the american friends of the middle east was none

other than kermit kim roosevelt. this name could be familiar to you before this evening because he's known as the cia who led the 1953 coo operation in iran that toppled the nationalist government, prime minister, and restored the role of the shaw and also roosevelt was an american aristocrat. he was a grandson of thoedore ruse vet and early head of the cia middle east divisions. that's his field command of 1953 coo, a sided case of blowback; right?

it led to this, and led to hostility, two questions, first of which was the cia doing funding this pro-ash antidesignonnist group, and not what one expected the cia to be doing, and why was kim roosevelt the enemy of nationalism in iran, why was he backing the group, which, among other things advocated for arab national i.c.e.s like the egyptian nasa? well, i did look at records, snoop around in other record groups like at the state

department and go to british records as well. you learn a surprising amount of information about cia operations in the period or speculation of private papers, things like that, and interviews with surviving intelligence offices of the day and family members of them, and what emerged from the research was an account of the cia in the 1940s and 1950s, and this is, at the moment, really at the birth of the cia coming into existence in 1947, and this a also the redding the beginning of the u.s. official involvement in the middle east. it's even little official u.s. presence there prior to this period. what i merges is history of the cia in the middle east during these crucial decades, but with

at its core, kermit roosevelt, partly a biography ever roosevelt, but also a group biography including archie roosevelt, his cousin and another grandson of tr, and this somewhat colorful, ram bun, personality and different background from the aristocrat roosevelt cousins, copeland, from the south of alabama, compared with roosevelt, he was from the wrong side of the tracks and really becomes an industry commentator after leaving the agency on intelligence affairs. he's also somewhat and probably the father of stuart copeland, the drummer for the police, in case you didn't know that. now, these three men, archie and

miles copeland are trying to shape the cia's early program in the middle east, and as kim roosevelt's involvement in 1953 suggest this involves creating quite a lot of disorder in the middle east, attempts at the various operations and attempts that they say is a legacy of the anti-americanism, still troubles u.s. relations with the region today, but at the same time, these men were arabic. that is, they knew a great deal about the middle world and finding sympathetic towards it believing they had the best interest at heart. what this book attempts to do is capture this moment with the cia

was most definitely pro-arab and ask, where did this impulse come from? where did it go? why did it eventually become eclipsed by other impulses in u.s. foreign policy? it came from the brich ire prior to u.s.' entry in the early years was cold war. the roosevelt cousins, in particular, were -- they were captivated by the example of british arabics, for example, te lawrence, lawrence ever arabia, they both read up, grew up reading his accounts, his

involvement in world war i, the seven pillars of wisdom, kim roosevelt's father knew lawrence personally and corresponded with him, so they have a tradition of the moe ran tick british attraction towards the arabs, but this is where the concept of the great kanes came in, and they read the british empire and author of kim, add adventure sty about a young anglo-indian spy in india at the time of the barrage, which really shaped kermit roosevelt's imagination theory in particular, and where his nickname, kim, stuck with him throughout his adult life, came from, and i think it's from this sort of this british

influence that the roosevelt cousins in particular get a notion of the middle east, the east generally, the orients, a taste of adventure for heroic espionage #* game, but this is not the only influence on them. i think it's also important to realize that there was another tradition on which they drew. i think the american one, and it was a sort of nonofficial one. it is the legty left by generation of american missionaries in the early arab world in the early 1800s, had not succeeded in conversion of the nonchristians there, but nevertheless, they left an important legacy in the region, finding schools, hospitals, and

universities, american university of beirut, the most important university in the world prior to the 1940s and 1950s, and it was a creation of the missionaries who identify with arab nationalism, there's institutions of american university of beirut and creation of nationalist ideology in the arab world. in addition to the british imperial traditions, the cia arabists also drawing on this history of the missionary, american missionary engagement with the middle east which is atruncated to the cia through a number of people in missionary stock who ran the u.s.' espionage effort in the middle east during world war ii. characters like william eddy and

his biographer, thomas litner, is here tonight. i think this is really the explanation of the puzzle that i started this research with, which is what is the cia funding organization like the american and explains an arabist element within the young cia helps explain why it was that kermit roosevelt also organized covert backing for that sac -- nasa in egypt, statement, that's cermet roosevelt overthrowing the nationalist prime minister of iran. he is aiding the cause of the arab nationalist leader of

egypt, a government that was created in the wake of the 1952 egyptian revolution against defiant british monarchy, and kermit roosevelt dispatches a cia team led by miles copeland. copeland's cover at this point is that of a booze allen hamilton employee, and that name could be familiar to you because it was also the company employing edward snowden at the time of his revolutions about nsa surveillance. the miles copeland and booze allen's hamilton's involvement 234 -- in cairo suggests that this kind of element or of advertising in

public relations, public relations no how is conveyed to the nasa regime through not just copeland, but a friend whose actual background is with the american advertising company, jw thompson, so i sort of shatter in my book madmen on the nile. it's sort of madmen performing secret operations in cairo elements to the story at to point. i won't go into anymore detail about the forms that cia arabism took. you can read about those in the book, but i do want to say a few words about the decline of cia arabism. why it is that the arabists,

pro-arab, antizionist agenda ultimately failed because, clearly, it failed. nasa became estranged from the united states and became quite anti-american. after 1956, the u.s. throws its weight not so much behind arab nationalists as behind conservative, british colonial era leer in the middle east. meanwhile, at home, the american friends of the middle east, that cia front group that is advocating on behalf of nasa and arab nationalism generally, and attacking american zionist mentioning u.s. shouldn't be behind israel and nasa and u.s. identification with arab

nationalism increasingly gives way to support for conservative regimes and pro-israel foreign policy. at the cia arabists themselves, as a group, split up by 1958, kermit roosevelt quit the agency, so too has miles copeland both going to the oil industry, for more profitable employment, and he says with the cia but moved to another region. now there were nefarious forces underminding the cia program from the outside, john foster sollace, secretary of state at the time, takes a strong personal dislike to nasa, and the british proved very

effective at securing american support for their basically antinationalist agenda in the u.s -- excuse me, the middle east, so that the u.s. starts to rally around british clients regimes in the region. conservative arab leaders themselves also contribute to this move on -- within u.s. foreign policy. i think there's also a big internal problem, as it were, with cia arabism, and that is that they are so attracted to the tradition of lawrence and the great game that they resort too readily, too easily to covert operations in order to address a u.s. policy challenges in the middle east.

i think this is particularly true of kermit roosevelt, nicknamed kim, and i think that it's just to return to that, started out with, and the friend of arab nationalism is working to overthrow a nationalist prime minister in iran. i think if you study papers and you read his memoir of the event, you know, it's clear that the cold war, u.s. [laughter] iranian oil fields are important considerations for roosevelt as they were for other americans involved in the panning of the operation, but for him personally, i think what really caused him to run this operation

to see it through to the end was this desire to play spy games and act in the tradition of the lawrence and the hero of the novel that had inspired his nickname. his memoirs in 1953 operation "counter cue" published rather unfortunately, 1959, of course, the year of the iranian revolution. the memoir reads almost like an old-fashioned british adventure story in the tradition of kipling or john in particular. i just read "the dream mantle," and there's similarities between the adventure story and this memoir of a real cia operation.

despite trying to overcome the british imperial legacy in the middle east supporting arab nationalists, kim roosevelt ended up by playing an american version of the great game. so what are we to do with this now? what lessons can be drawn from this story of cia arabism? well, i'm an academic and a historian, so i'm a little uncomfortable about reflecting on current affairs, try to avoid the historical sin of presentism, and in any case, i'm not sure the lessons are a lack of fear. on the one hand, the surprising fact that cia arabism existed at all suggests that there's nothing, you know, there's nothing ineventually -- inevitable about conflict between the u.s. and the arab

world. this earlier history of happier relations between americans and arab fight in the face of those who would argue there's some sort of inevitable fascist civilization between americans and arabs. on the other hand, and this is something reviewers have pointed out, it is striking how close they were to the road, seeings supporting arab-nationalists and support pro-western conservative regimes in the region. cia proved a slender read indeed. this really is a foundational moment in relations, and if you

look in the region from egypt to syria to iran, that origins can be traced to this foundational moment when the u.s. established an official presence in the middle east, and when the cia was created and ran these operations. in other words, i think if you really want to understand what's going on now, we have to know about the early history. thanks very much for your attention. [applause] >> two quick questions, the state department in the 40s was full of arabist, and marshall threatened to resign if truman recognized israel or was unhappy

about it. were they connected with the state department people? my other question is suez, and you talk about that in the book, the british, french, and middle east expeditions retake the suez canal. were they involved in that somehow? >> thank you, what a great question. yes, they were between the cia arabists and arabists in the state department, lloyd henderson is important here, another man named edwin wright, a leading state department arabist who coached the young archie roosevelt when he started having assignments in the middle east. you know, it's a widespread phenomena in u.s. governing circles at this point, and a number of people that believe that the u.s. should really be throwing weight behind the arab world than behind israel and

initially oppose the partition of palestine and then u.s. recognition of israel because it's a battle that they lose because the power's designed in american public life is growing and achieving that support of congressmen and so on, so, yeah, of course, there is growing american popular supporters as well for the zionist call precisely because of the devastating impacts of the holocaust, so, yeah, it is a phenomena that embraces both the state department and the cia. with regards to the suez, the -- they are not personally involved. my three arabists except that they all claimed later to have received some information from british friends of theirs rather than british spies, mi-6, that

something was afoot. of course, it should perhaps have presented the arabists with a wonderful moment of opportunity, the fact that the u.s. effectively intervenes on behalf of the arab world, and against the british and the french and the israelis, but by this point already, john foster dulles really become fed up with nasa and i think the real story, in some ways, i think historians are now seeing suez as in a way an aberration of the main story is this growing u.s. irritation with and distancing from arab nationalism, and sort of approach more with britain in the region, so behind the scenes, the british and americans, despite suez, are

actually starting to grow closer together, and this, to is certain extent, happens at the espionage level, the cia and mi-6 that start the sore in american relations that lend lease to this general. the u.s. kind of taking over britain's imperial burden as the british certainly saw it in the middle east in the years of suez. thank you for those questions. mpleghtsz you may have answered this, but that l of all the personnel in the book, is there not one that thought might be a problem of basic values, contradiction of islam and the west? the reason i say that is because i studied from 1750 to 1950, and there's a number of major figures that did see such a fundamental clash, adams, we

wesley, not a single figure like that in the personnel of the arabists? >> amongst the arabists, no, there is this belief in a need for sort of christian and muslim civilizations to move closer together, based on the religions, ways of life share many things in common. it's, for some of the older arabists of missionary light, william eddy, perhaps the funding father of u.s. espionage in the middle east, almost has this mystical belief in the links between islam and christianity, and he sees himself sort of almost as a bridge figure between the two civilizations. i think his happyist moment comes when he's the interpreter

of franklin and roosevelt and saudi king at the end of the world war ii. it's in the book, yeah, so he's the interpreter because he has arabic so i think he -- i'm not sure that the roosevelt cousins have quite this kind of intense belief in the convergence of christianity and that somebody like eddy did, but it still is there, i think, and the american friends of the middle east is sort of geared towards trying to generate dialogue and theological conversations as well, something called the continuing committee on muslim christian cooperation in which the cia is funding by the american friends of the middle east, so this -- and this is all sort of prior to, you know, ultimately courses from -- becomes in the eyes of some u.s.

covert operatives, political warfare funding islamists, fundamentalists against the soviet union speaks to a history of blow back which many of us assimilate today, but for arabists like eddy, i think there is this, really, an intense belief that the need for jen dmiew win, mutually reenforcing a dialogue between christians and muslims. >> excuse me? >> [inaudible] >> well, no, i'm just saying that amongst the arabists, the group i'm describing, they didn't so much subscribe to that view. >> hi, there. a couple questions. >> sure. >> i guess, first off, how united would you say the arabists were?

i mean, when you look at how many different movements emerged simultaneously, and there was, obviously, plenty of conflict, you know, internally just like today, although maybe not quite as intensely, but fairly intensely, you know, how united were they? do you see some examples where there were some real breaks with them, within the group? and then, i guess, just with the two -- the two roosevelt grand sons, maybe asking you to speculate a little, but what would you say would teddy roosevelt himself have been on their side, or do you think he might have been more on the, as you call it, the conservative, sort of more sort of standard american interest side of the equation? if there's even a way to speculate. i'm just asking. >> sure, sure. i think with regards to the possibility of divisions amongst the arabists, i think they are

fairly concerted in terms of their values and division that they have for the arab world. there are -- kermit roosevelt, of the two roosevelt cousins, i think is more inclined to covert action, and i think archie roosevelt was a little more cautious, even conservative in his approach, but nonetheless even he actually in 1956 and 1957 was involved in coo operations to overthrow the government of syria, trying to repeat the feat that roosevelt performed in 1953, and there was a little bit personal rivalry as well, and archie factored himself as the feign guy in the u.s.' chris middle east divisions, and that's the role that kermit eventually acquired, and i think there was a

little -- miles copeland's ram bun,ness caught on, and the personal clashes rather than anything more substantial. as regards roosevelt's likely views in terms -- well, certainly, i mean, he saw and believed that the u.s. should be -- that the britain's successor in the region, and i suspect he would have approved of roosevelt's hunger for manly adventure. i think that there's a sense in which the 1953 coo operation is roosevelt's attempt to sort of have his own story like his grandfather's charge up kettle

hill or whatever, there's the ghost of theodore roosevelt hovering there with generation of men, a benign presence, but it's one that's slightly judging, and feels like they never quite measure up to. there's a element of psychological drama going on within the roosevelt family as well. thank you. >> hi. >> hi. >> i look forward to reading your book. i wanted to know, are you familiar with kings counsel? written by jack o'connell? >> a recent publication, yeah. >> norton in 201 # 1, station chief in the middle east in the 60s and into the 70s, and he gives quite an account of the cia's role in the middle east during that period. are you familiar with the book? you know, are you familiar with that portion of the history of the agency in the middle east during the 60s and 70s that you like to comment on? >> sure. i don't really.

it seems to me, when i was actually expecting, when i wrote the book, to take it a little bit further into the 196 # 0s and probably finish with the 1967 significant year, the arabists in the sense that, you know, it's a year they see the arab course sort of routed in the middle east itself, and it's also the year that the cia funding of the various prompt groups is revealed in the media, so the american friends of the middle east is revealed as a cia front, of course, deeply embarrassing to it and the zionist enemies, so the arabists cause kind of his -- really falls apart, really, in 1967, but i think it's already that process already in a sense taking place before then, and in 1958 emerged really as the true narrative, as it were, because that's the year when my three main characters who dive from

the agency or from the middle east within the arab world, but i do know, in answer to the original question, i do know that book. it's a fascinating book, and -- >> [inaudible] >> yes, yeah, and jack o'connell, his presence in jordan and that's really what the book is about; right? about his function as a sort of cia liaison with an adviser to hussein of jordan. it begins at the very end of my story, really, it adds the u.s. and cia changing sides from arab nationalists to governments identifying with british imperial interests in the region. glad you mentioned it. >> i just might mention that dave dedicated to the washington

post, and fill in that gap taking it to the next step from your book, this is a great book. >> okay. >> thank you. >> hello. >> hi. >> i'm curious, i have not read the book, but i read the synopsis and listened to your speech here. i'm just thinking that it has to be more geopolitics than anything else, and the use of the term "arabic" sound more like more romance of young men who wanted to go off on adventures in the middle east, which sounds like complete fiction to me, but if you can explain more or get more eve of the arabism, i think it's much more likely the cia was being

the cia, and thftion something that was going on, you know, as a chess game, geopolitics, getting there by funding -- the typical stuff. >> yeah, yeahings right. i understand what you're getting at with that question, and, clearly, i, this is sort of the course on a 25-minute presentation, i could have gone through the cold war dimension of it and the oil, obviously, the oil question, the u.s.' desire to ensure that the west, you know, still has access to the incredibly important resource -- >> [inaudible] >> yeah, sure, but when i stated researching the subject, though, there was overwhelming evidence of this sort of proarab tendency amongst the first generation of cia officers in the middle east. it's something that kermit roosevelt was advocating for before he joined # the agency in

1949, you know, he was -- he was creating these arabists citizen groups to advocate for the arab side, and against the partitionists of palestine even before he was in the agency. he wrote a book in 1948 sort of advancing the arabist case to the american public, like, i guess, many previous generations of roosevelt, engaged in public life in addition to the career as the conservist in the cia. so he was very sort of not,ed o- not accounted of the evidence. >> i was curious if there's meat behind it. why? just grew up forever reading about kipling? that just seems crazy, but -- >> well, no, but it's where people like kermit roosevelt got

initial ideas of the middle east from because there was not this tradition of the u.s. engagement with the middle east prior to this period in the same way the wars with the british and the french, really only american missionaries and educators and oilmen in the middle east, and they, people like roosevelt parched through the has hands oe missionaries who were pro-arab, working for the office of strategic services, didn't have time for that aspect of the story as well, but the cia's recurse of the strategic services during world world war, the middle east division dominated by the people who had pro-arab outlook on the region and u.s.' role there. that was another influence on these people, you know, and i -- those other -- because, of course, there are elements that are important, and, ultimately, they do -- they win the day; right? the arabists lose the argument

as it were, but nonetheless, it was there in the beginning, undibly -- undeniably there. thank you. >> so i'm curious as to what extent did the arabists who were free agents opposed to just carrying out the policies of the president and the secretary of state and the head of the cia, and i guess relatedly whether the arabs -- i mean, were the arabs -- did you find the arabists as though who were anti-zionists, or were there promoting an agenda which would make the life of the bulk of the arabs better? i mean, you know, did they support the algiers revolt or support the french? >> no. well, archie roosevelt along

with many other americans in the middle east during world world i and in north africa in particular were really quite anti-french and i identifieded with the air independence movements in the french-dominated regions of north africa, and archie roosevelt was sent home briefly because of the tendency to criticize the french so, i mean, it was really striking as i was reading his memoirs, and, also, his diary of the involvement in world war ii, how profoundly he identified with the cause of arab nationalism in north africa, befriending various, you know, arab independent leaders and others. during that period, you also asked about how independently these guys were, and i think

they initially have a lot of latitude within the cia because there's not that area of expertise about the region, and they know something about it, or claim to know something about it, and they are, you know, they are dullless from an aristocratic background, and cia director from 1950 inclined to give him his head, as it were, in this field, but they sat upon, as it were, the brother becoming increasingly fed up with arab nationalism within the context of cold war departs in

the agenda and i think roosevelt , the decision to leave in the 1958 is because dulles is no longer listening to him. he was wildly successful in the career and iran was a cia legend, as it were, but then things start turn sour for him, no longer given the polarity that he originally had. i think the answer to the question is initially they had a surprising amount of freedom slashed on their own, but later, that declined and led to their departure. >> thank you. >> you're welcome. >> hi.

>> hello. >> you keep referring to them as arabists, but back then in the 50s, did they have the sense that the iranians are not arab? they are not even sunni. in fact, they would be offended if they were called that probably, and did these guys have a level of sophistication or lump them all as middle east, arab? what is that? >> it's interesting. i mean, they are, roosevelt didn't have arabic, but miles copeland did. the three of them were knowing a great deal of the world and inclined to sympathize, but that attitude did not extend to iranians. archie overthaws most of them, in iran on the years after world war ii rat the time of the cold

war struggle takes place in iran, 1946-1947 #, and it's clear from the account of that moment he does, in fact, see them in sort of orientalist, british, you know, racist terms and writes about it, and similar to this element of at the same time that you sthiz with and relate to the arabs, you don't feel the same way about iranians there as well for kim roosevelt in 1953, very ready to sort of accept the british analysis of what's going on in iran, that these are weak-minded hysterical people that will succumb to soviet influence unless we get in there.

i don't know why that is. i think it's partly to do with the fact that iran is more, clearly, a battlefield in the early cold war just as it had been in the british soviet great gains, so perhaps they are more inclined to accept the british view and see as a place for great gain adventures, but you're right, there is that distinction, and it faces the advantage of the arabs, but not those in iran. >> thank you. >> you're most welcome. >> hi. hi, i'm curious to try to determine is there any link between the arabism and the state department and the chaos that seems to be part of the attitude that today the state

department as towards the arab nations? the situation in syria is so chaotic as to be laughable as far as i'm concern. can one bring any lessons or can one -- is there any way of linking the arabist of that time to the present time or maybe it's too much a stretch. >> no, i don't think it is at all. as i suggested at the end of the talk, there's really extraordinary to the continue newties and similarlies between recent events and what was going on in the 40s and 50s, and the coo in iran in 1953 and it is talked about in iran today, and it's still an issue in u.s.-iranian relations, the --

you can argue, in fact, that the success in stabilizing the regime in egypt leads to the ideaability, of course, making a leap, but it could partly explain the irritability of the military governments in egypt that just returned to power, and the similarities between syria in the 1950s and more recently, really very striking, in particular, last summer, i think, when i was reading stories in the newspapers about, you know, why is the cia in their running covert operations to overthrow the assad regime? in fact, the same things are going on in 1956 and 1957, although, this was not discussed publicly, but nonetheless, there were intents to mobilize syria opposition groups to overthrow

the land leftist government in syria and the cia just lacked assets within syria to be able to do that, so -- >> in essence, the manpower and spy power or whatever his need is? >> exaltly. >> yeah. >> and the links to opposition groups, something that kermit very much made a point of saying repeatedly is that you can't bring about regime change unless there is this substantial element of people within the country in question, that are willing to go through with it. it can't just be simply brought about by external manipulation, and i guess that is holding true today. yeah, yeah. >> okay. >> thank you very much. >> you're welcome. >> i had a question about the agency of the arabist mentioned as well as 67, the significance

of that. in terms of agency, you sort of say, well, it is kind of surprising when you look at it from today's partnership of view that the cia was funding all these, you know, proarab antizionist entities, but i recall 25 years ago going to the soviet union, working in the museum, moscow, geopolitical maps from the 40s, 50s, 6 os, prosoviet countries of the world, and the pro-american ones were blue, and what's interesting is the newly created israel was colored red, socialist ideas, and arab states were the color blue, and that doesn't change, if i remember, until the late 50s when everything switches around; right? and then it looks as israel as the attachment of the united states. looking from that element, the

soviets have a similar take in terms of knowing who they want to support during those crucial years so i wonder, isn't it more a question of geopolitics and directives rather than the agency of some arabist that happen to be sort of believers in the great christian, arabic civilization? second question, 67, you say, well, 67's a turning point. isn't it more 91? that's the key question, when the soviet union collapses, and when it does, the whole prism of looking at the region through this geopolitical lens physicals apart, and in the process, the soviets makes it a more dangerous place because the soviet union is not around anymore to keep the place in check, and there's no interlocker to put the lid on them to permit crisis from spinning out of control. to what degree is 91 more

important, and for arabists who write on the region, and the region. >> briefly, you're right about how it's sort of -- it flips the region in terms of cold war geopolitical calculations that the side is like likely to fall into the soviet cap rather than the u.s. and stall lip does not have that much interest in the arab countries to begin with, and so -- but that changes with stalin coming to power and he sees that the middle east is up for grabs as the cold war extends into the third world, and the arabists lose the arguments, and within the cia, that james angleton, better

known as a chief of counter intelligence runs the israeli's so-called account, which is growing espionage connection between the cia and massad and the arab world lost to the americans, that then increasingly becomes very important alliance for the u.s., not just within the middle east, but elsewhere as well in africa, for example, so, yeah, i -- and your point about 1991, end of the cold war well taken as well. i mean, i don't mean to argue for the insignificance of geopolitical considerations as compared to this arabist impulse. i mean, ultimately, it's the geopolitics, perhaps sort of wrongly analyzed by the like of john foster dulles with such by their polar cold war view of the world, but ultimately that wins

out over the impulse, but nonetheless, i think its existence is interesting and suggestsive, you know, apath not taken, worth studying that moment to find out why it wasn't. >> [inaudible] >> okay. i have here in my hands today's "washington post" reading the headline from page 7. kerry admits progress, risk of failure in the middle east. other than the confusion by this headline, have we ever got anything right in the middle east other than oil? maybe that means we should get out of there? [laughter] >> oh, i -- you know, i'll leave that question hanging there, i think. [laughter] [inaudible conversations] >> yeah, yeah. >> did we get anything right? >> well, i -- i think that --

well, what did the u.s. get right in the middle east? let's try to end on a happier note. i hope it doesn't sound frivolous, but, you know, there is this earlier history of a welcomed, benign presence of the united states and the middle east, you know, the era in which saw the creation of institutions, finding important institutions like american university of beirut -- excuse me? >> [inaudible] >> right. >> [inaudible] >> yeah. well, it's -- and i think it's, you know, it's worth remembering that moment, and refer, anybody here not familiar with the work of historians of the relationship, rice university to his work because it's a really fascinating moment that is less known than it should be.

and on that somewhat evasive response, i'll say thank you very much for your questions. [applause] for more information, visit the author's website, americasgreatgame.com. >> the purpose of the book is to not only talk about how to revive constitutionally restore the republic, but inform foreign people what the republic is supposed to look like, how the constitution is supposed to function, and move decision making away from the centralized government back to the state legislatures that can collectively as the framers intended. >> host: you write about the 17th amendment. the 17th amendment serves nots the public interest, but the interest of the governing master minds and their disciples, early proponts advance. it is not because they championed democracy or the

individual, but because they nigh it would be one of several important mechanisms for empowering the federal government and unraveling constitutional republicanism. >> guest: right. the framers did not create democracy. that would be absolute notary public sense and crazy. in fact, if you look at the constitution, it's very complex what they created here. you know, the central government with limited enumerated powers, three brnchs, each of which is supposed to be working with each other, sometimes checking each other, and, of course, you have the states where all the power is to exist and the individual where all the individual sovereignty, obviously, exists, so this idea that direct elections is what the framers intended is not correct. they intended it for the house of representatives, and then the notes make it clear, they debated this at length, what the senate was to look like, went back and fort with different models, but when it came to the

senate, madison and the others made quite clear you could not have the direct election of senators without creating an all-powerful nationalized central government. they wanted a federal republic, not an all powerful centralize the government, and they even made this case to the states when it went to the states for the ratification of the constitution. they said, look, the senate is made up of individuals chosen by the state legislature, so you'll have a role in the federal law making process among other things, so the federalists used the senate, among other things, the nature of the senate, to persuade the antifederalists to support the constitution, and if we had had direct election of senators in the original constitution, there would not be an original constitution. the states would not have ratified it. furthermore, who exactly did the senators represent? it's the most bizarre body that man ever created, i mean, there's two from every state. we get that.

that was to balance the large states and the small states, but the direct election of senators? you have situations now british imperial senators voted for, say, obamacare where states goff's and attorney general fought obamacare in court and trying to protect their citizens from obamacare when the senators voted for it. it's bizarre. the senate today, really, is an odd construct so the purpose of the senate was to empower the state legislatures and the federal law making process, not to just have another ability to vote. ..